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Abstract 
The Indian Ocean is the third largest of the world’s oceanic divisions. As a critical sea trade route 
marked with the presence of strategic chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, and 
the Mandeb Strait, Its ever strategic position has eventually led to a potential turbulent security 
environment, as states fall deeper into a sense of vulnerability because of the fragile security of the 
region. Connecting the continents of Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, and consisting of tens of littoral 
states, contemporarily the Indian Ocean has been home to coercively interpreted policies which among 
them include China’s “String of Pearls,’ and the numerous naval exercises conducted such as the 
MALABAR and AUSINDEX, acting as an offensive military posturing to many. As the Indian Ocean 
slowly evolves being a centre stage of geopolitical supremacy contestation, the paper argues for the 
urgent need for the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) to adopt measures in advance of the 
tempestuous security environment. Being the Chairman of IORA for 2015-2017, Jokowi’s ‘Global 
Maritime Axis’ will be tested by how he plans to respond towards the growing volatile security 
situation. It further argues of possible engagements Jokowi can take in order to solidify the very concept 
of ‘Global Maritime Axis’ that he conceived, by arguing the need for him to establish foundations of 
cooperation that would bind IORA member states as well as great powers which are critical towards 
the Indian Ocean’s sea-lanes of communication, and the need to take the step of replacing the highest 
authority of the IORA, to a Heads of State Summit, in order to clout more of a significant political 
influence in the region. 
Keywords: Indonesia, Indian Ocean, Regionalism, Institutionalism, Foreign Policy 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The Indian Ocean is arguably one of 
the most strategic and valuable oceans in the 
world. With an abundance of resources 
located, connecting numerous continents, 
and home to tens of littoral states, It is no 
surprise that the oceans will be the center 
stage of the upcoming political 
contestations. As a matter of fact, it already 
is. Though not heavily exposed at the 
current moment, the Indian Ocean 
represents an interpreted volatile security 
Journal of Society and Governance – Volume 1 No.1 January 2017  
(http://journal.unhas.ac.id/index.php/jsg) 
 
62 
Journal of Society and Governance 
environment, filled with great powers that 
have been contesting with one another, to 
secure the sea lanes they deem foundational 
towards the International trade. But the 
offensive military posturing present today 
marks an immense drawback to the efforts 
of organizations such as the Indian Ocean 
Rim Association, a pan-regional 
organization aimed to advance peaceful and 
economic cooperation among the littoral 
states.  
Geopolitical rivalries have risen, 
mainly concerning China and India, two of 
the great powers holding an immense 
interest in the region. Such rivalries are 
caused not only because of the abundance of 
resources located in the Indian Ocean but 
because the concern here is to secure the 
Gulf petroleum exports. For energy 
supplies, the travel starts in the Persian Gulf, 
all the way to the East (Asia). But besides 
being a route for energy, one-fifth of the 
world’s energy supplies navigate through 
these seas (Laipson, Pandya, 2009), 
establishing a top priority for states 
dependent on Middle Eastern oil, to engage 
upon policies that would secure their needs.  
The question that arises thus is the 
long-term stability of the Indian Ocean, and 
this is where Indonesia comes into place. 
Since Jokowi’s election in 2014, there has 
been a constant rhetoric of ‘Global 
Maritime Axis,’ a maritime predominant 
foreign policy that would eventually 
maximize Indonesia’s strategic position 
being in between the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans. This concept though has been far 
from effective, and still until this very day, 
raises questions of what does Jokowi want 
with this idea. An inward, or outward based 
policy? A grand vision, a policy, or a 
strategy? The lack of clarity not only raises 
confusion, but also raises an urgency for 
Jokowi to step up his foreign policy game, 
and start embracing the words that he 
continuously echoed in the past until present 
times. Such clarity can be achieved by 
strategically using the IORA, as a venue to 
realize his concept of a global maritime 
axis, by engaging on several key elements 
that not only will realize his visions, but also 
establish significant change towards the 
current political environment of the Indian 
Ocean. Keep in mind that Indonesia is also 
a littoral state, a state heavily influenced by 
the conditions that have happened in the 
Straits of Malacca concerning numerous 
non-traditional threats. So it would be in 
Indonesia’s utmost interest to establish the 
foundations through steps that would be 
explained further in the following pages.  
It is no question that the vast seas of 
the Indian Ocean are filled with numerous 
resources. To name a few, it is known to be 
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the home of fish stock, deep sea minerals, 
and an immense potential of holding 
unexplored, energy reserves (Amjad, 
2007). This paper does not neglect that fact, 
yet will only focus on the political 
dynamics of the sea lane of 
communications in the Indian Ocean, as 
well as Indonesia’s position in such a 
matter.  
 
 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To be able to see the status quo, and 
to predict the future political environment 
of the Indian Ocean, one needs to combine 
numerous concepts developed by 
International Relations academics. First of 
all is the concept of great powers, and the 
influence it has towards the regional 
political environment. Observing the 
foreign policies of great powers is one 
fascinating thing to do. Though still 
arguably open on the precise definition of 
great powers, Mearsheimer, a prominent 
International Relations scholar and founder 
of Offensive Realism, made an ever 
impactful research on this particular matter. 
He described great powers as those states 
having sufficient military assets to 
challenge conventional warfare with strong 
states (Mearsheimer, 2014).  
States that classify herein are those 
known as the strongest regionally and is in 
a constant state to seek regional hegemony. 
A status that only the US currently holds as 
of present times. But this fascinating 
analysis if linked to this paper would reveal 
the offensive military posturing and foreign 
policies of both India and China, two 
emerging economies and powers, seeking 
to dominate their region and clout a more 
significant influence compared to any other 
state in the area. As the Indian Ocean 
consists of numerous emerging powers, 
what has eventually occurred in the Indian 
Ocean thus is a contestation of powers, 
among the great powers. The contestations 
though does not side-line the littoral states, 
but at this current issue, the level of 
desperation is high towards the courses of 
action taken by great powers. What 
solidifies this concern also is the latent and 
military power that these states possess. 
They have both a strong socio-economic 
capacity to build military power, and also 
equipped already in the status quo with a 
decently strong military power.  
 The second level of analysis in on a 
geopolitical level of analysis. Early 
geopolitical theorists have mostly focused 
on the rational of states expanding or 
annexing their defined state territory under 
International law. But Ratzel in 1940 went 
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further by providing analysis of the case of 
sea expansions that was conducted by 
Germany during the Second World War, in 
which Germany sought an expansionist 
agenda in both land and sea (Agnew, 
Mitchell, Toal, 2013). In the contemporary 
times, this concept has been packaged more 
neatly by great powers. An example being 
the US, going through oceans worldwide 
while embracing the concept of ‘freedom of 
navigation’ to justify such actions. The 
South China Sea is another great example, 
of China’s attempt to expand land, that 
would eventually lead to the more stretched 
out exclusive economic zone of China. But 
the Indian Ocean does not consist of this 
reality, which makes it a more complex 
security environment. The need to secure 
shipping lanes in the Indian Ocean has led 
to strategies that are not overt in nature as 
being an expansionist policy. States like 
China through the development and 
investments of ports surrounding the Indian 
Ocean, India’s attempt to solidify its 
primacy in the region through naval 
exercises, reflects a complicated reality in 
which foreign policies must be seen as 
patterns, with geopolitical supremacy over 
the Indian Oceans being the ultimate goal. 
The last level of analysis concerns the 
Neoliberal Institutionalism. As 
globalization prevails, we are witnessing an 
abundance of actors besides the state, 
having a significant influence on the course 
of world politics. The opening of borders 
became the foundational assumption of the 
neoliberal institutionalism, in their basic 
premise was that cooperation was possible 
to be conducted through an actor known as 
International organizations. This concept 
further elaborates on the dominance of 
states in such organizations, driven by their 
individual national interest. But as 
cooperation would establish a greater good 
for those states, compromises would be 
made, therefore making the grounds of 
peaceful cooperation among the states 
(Stein, 2008). Neoliberal Institutionalism is 
what makes institutions such as IORA able 
to exist. United by a common interest of 
advancing economic interests and securing 
the Indian Ocean, IORA was thus 
established with the aim of handling such a 
mutual interest of the littoral states, as well 
as foreign powers having interests in the 
region. This is a critical theory to equip 
ourselves with if we are to predict any 
significant changes of the organization, 
which will be the primary emphasis of the 
upcoming pages of this paper.  
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C. DISCUSSION 
Great Power Political Dynamics In The 
Indian Ocean 
Contemporary power rivalries taking 
place in the South China Sea reflects a 
particular message, of the immediate 
importance of both energy security, and 
sea-lanes of communications are for state 
actors.  As we currently move towards an 
ever open globalized world, the 
interconnections among states have led to a 
constant insecurity of states, as they 
become more fragile of the dynamics taking 
place even on another half of the world. The 
political dynamics of the Indian Ocean may 
one day impede the global trade of not only 
littoral states but also of numerous states 
which engage upon International trade on 
those oceans. Thus it is essential to equip us 
firstly with the understanding of what 
makes the Indian Ocean so strategic, as well 
as the contemporary turbulent security 
environment of the region. 
 
1.1. The Strategic Importance of the 
Indian Ocean 
The Indian Ocean’s supreme and 
foremost importance lays upon its strategic 
position, connecting the likes of the African 
Continent, Middle East, all the way to Asia. 
Hundreds to thousands go through the sea-
lanes of the Indian Ocean daily, pushing the 
need to secure such sea-lanes of 
communications to maintain stability and 
continuity of any economic trades taking 
place in the region. This urgency thus has 
created certain paranoia of states with the 
intention of securing such sea-lanes. But in 
the application, power rivalries eventually 
surface, though not overt, the patterns are 
visible. The question arises thus is how 
could this come to be? 
Out of the global oceanic divisions, 
the Indian Ocean does not position the 
highest. It is only the third largest following 
the Pacific, and the Atlantic Oceans. But 
what makes the Indian Ocean unique is that 
it comprises of three strategic chokepoints, 
namely the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-
Mandab Strait, and the Strait of Malacca. It 
thus connects the likes of the African 
Continent, Middle East, and Asia, in a 
single sea-lane located at the very heart of 
the Indian Ocean.  
But the security of the Indian Ocean 
goes beyond of the simple securing of the 
sea-lanes of communication, as it also 
constitutes as a major concern for energy 
security.  Basic figures have shown, that 
32.2 millions of barrels of crude oil and 
petroleum are transported each day through 
the strategic chokepoints mentioned above 
(Albert, 2016). As commodities have been 
popular to be carried through seaborne 
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commerce, energy seems also to be 
included, as approximately 2/3 of the 
world’s maritime oil trades pass the Indian 
Ocean (Goud, Mookherjee, 2015). With 
such figures, it is no surprise that the Indian 
Ocean can be concluded as one of the most 
important energy routes when it comes to 
the case of International trade.  
The millions of barrels of oil 
transported each day through the sea-lanes 
of the Indian Ocean can be attributed to the 
Strait of Hormuz, linking the Persian Gulf 
region with their vast amounts of oil 
supplies, to South Asia, all the way to 
China. As demands for energy rapidly 
increase, especially among emerging 
economies and populations, energy exports 
thus act as a lucrative business for the 
principal oil producers of the world, 
including United Arab Emirates, Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (Amjad, 2007).  
As the sea-lanes of communication act as a 
strategic region for both littoral states and 
the overall global economic trade, tensions 
have also arisen. Tensions among states are 
based upon the desperate need to secure the 
sea-lanes for the mere national interest of 
their energy security and overall 
International trade.  
 
 
 
1.2. The Surfacing of Great Power 
Rivalries 
The strategic value of the Indian 
Ocean has led to the region’s security 
environment being volatile. The 32 littoral 
states facing the Indian Ocean are a unique 
mix of diversity, and some separated from 
thousands of miles of sea. Among them you 
have developed and emerging economies, 
which has throughout the years projected 
their influence on the oceans. Australia for 
example, through the Eastward section of 
the Indian Ocean, has made significant 
build-ups and control over their Christmas 
Island and the Cocos Islands. Even further, 
Australia has shown the importance of the 
Indian Ocean through their first ever 
conducted AUSINDEX military exercise 
held last September 2015 in the Bay of 
Bengal, between the Indian Navy and the 
Royal Australian Navy (Parameswaran, 
2015). The projection of military might of 
two great powers of the Indian Ocean, is a 
response towards a possible unwanted 
development of a turbulent security 
environment. Though revolutionary, the 
contestations of might is no match 
compared to the rivalry between India and 
China in the region. 
To understand the contemporary 
geopolitical dynamics of the present Indian 
Ocean, one needs to consider China’s 
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emerging economy, and the price required 
to pay. As the expansion of China’s 
industrial and manufacturing commodities 
spreads exceptionally fast, energy demands 
will follow along (the additional x-factor 
being China’s population demand of 
energy). China currently is the second 
largest consumer and importer of oil, which 
has provided 54.8% of China’s oil 
requirements (Zhang, 2011), which majorly 
are sourced from the Gulf States. This 
reality has led to two major concepts of 
foreign policy that have often been quoted 
by India and its western counterparts, as a 
reason to contain China in the Indian 
Ocean. First being the ‘Malacca Dilemma,’ 
a term coined by President Hu Jintao in 
2003 to describe how it is only through the 
Strait of Malacca that China can receive the 
80% of the total amount of imported oil 
from the Middle East and Africa (Chen, 
2010), as other sea-lane alternative routes 
would raise total transportation time and 
cost. The second concept is the ‘String of 
Pearls,’ a geopolitical analysis showing 
China’s heavily influenced and invested 
islands and ports located in the littoral 
states of the Indian Ocean (Khurana, 2008). 
The concept of ‘String of Pearls’ has 
been stated as an exaggeration of China’s 
maritime interests. Though said that way, 
states such as India openly embraces 
foreign policies filled with paranoia, as if it 
was true that China plans on isolating India 
from the Indian Ocean, It would be an 
immense blow to India’s geopolitical 
aspirations of their backyard. As China is 
spreading its footprints in the immediate 
neighbourhood of India, India has 
responded through a series of naval 
capacity projections, including the 
MALABAR, an annual trilateral naval 
exercise with the US and Japan (regularly 
conducted since 2002) (Rajagopalan & 
Mishra, 2015), the VARUNA with France 
since 2002, and KONKAN with the UK 
since 2004. Annual military posturing in 
the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean in 
general, not only projects India’s naval 
capacity as well as pictured potential allies 
in cases of security breaches, but this is also 
inherently necessary for India to showcase 
such position as 80% of India’s energy are 
also imported from the Middle East (Singh, 
2015).  
Despite all of these current political 
dynamics, a major problem arises because 
of the uncertainty of the US response as of 
yet.  The US does have ground in the Indian 
Ocean through the American leased British 
Island of Diego Garcia (Pillalammari, 
2015), located below Sri Lanka. As 
expected, the US foreign policy on the 
Indian Ocean has primarily advocated the 
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concept of ‘Freedom of Navigation,’ and 
involvements with India’s naval power 
projections. But of course, it would be too 
early to guess upon Washington’s 
definitive move and policy in the Indian 
Ocean region. But despite uncertainties of 
the evolving political climate of the Indian 
Ocean, special initiatives needs to take 
place to maintain a stable and controlled 
Indian Ocean.  
 
Balancing Power Rivalries: Indonesia 
And The Indian Ocean Rim Association 
Being a source of an abundance of 
security threats, both traditional and non-
traditional, the political climate in the 
Indian Ocean is one very much 
unpredictable, and that itself is not a good 
sign. The question that arises is how the 
IORA, an organization embracing all the 
littoral states as well as partnering itself 
with major great powers, is able to clout 
influence on the political climate of the 
Indian Ocean Region, without its presence 
being neglected as in the case of the vast 
majority of regional organizations 
(example being ASEAN and SAARC). 
Below I outline the fundamentals of the 
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) as 
well as Indonesia’s role in such an 
organization. I then go on and explain 
Indonesia’s role in the IORA, as well as 
measures that should be taken to realize a 
more peaceful political climate in the 
Indian Ocean, but still aligning with the 
fundamental values of the Indonesian 
contemporary foreign policy.  
 
2.1. Reviewing Two Decades of 
Membership: Indonesia in the Indian 
Ocean Rim 
Though extremely diverse in nature, 
states of the Indian Ocean Rim Association 
(IORA) are united by the Indian Ocean. 
Previously this result of pan-regionalism in 
the Indian Ocean was known as the Indian 
Ocean Region-Association for Regional 
Cooperation (IOR-ARC) after its 
establishment in March 1997 (Rumley, 
Doyle, Chaturvedi, 2012). IORA consists 
of states bordering the Indian Ocean, with 
currently 21 member states and seven 
dialogue partners. Among the members of 
the IORA, despite immense differences, are 
all united to maintain and promote maritime 
safety & security, disaster risk 
management, trade & investment 
facilitation, fisheries management, tourism 
& cultural exchange, as well as academic, 
science and technology. 
In recent years there has been a strict 
emphasis upon an open regionalism with 
particular attention towards economic co-
operation.  But as tensions have recently 
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arisen, maritime safety and security have 
been persistently echoed in all the major 
forums of the IORA, including the highest 
authority of the IORA, the Council of 
Ministers that meets every two years (or 
whenever the Council decides to conduct 
meetings). Though often echoed in rhetoric, 
maritime security still lacks the proper 
long-term vision and conduct, in 
establishing a more stable political 
environment in the Indian Ocean. Such 
lacking are reflected by the very fact that 
numerous non-traditional security threats 
including piracy, is conducted without the 
inclusion of IORA, and strictly engaged 
multilaterally by the states willing to guard 
vessels going through the Gulf of Aden. An 
outsider would see that an organization 
consisting of such vast areas of ocean, is 
profoundly underinvested, and not taken 
seriously as much as regional organizations 
like the EU and ASEAN. But littoral states 
which will bear the most if insecurity 
escalates in the region, have shown 
potential and an indication of change. 
As Indonesia, since June 2015 took 
the rotation of Chairman of the IORA from 
Australia (2013-2015), expectations will be 
high. Jokowi through his Foreign Affairs 
Minister, Retno Marsudi, has constantly 
expressed how this will be in align with 
Indonesia’s grand vision of establishing a 
global maritime axis, as Indonesia is at the 
centre of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
Since 2015, we have seen several 
communiqués resulted, which aims to 
uphold stability in the Indian Ocean. Take 
for example the fact that Indonesia is the 
only chairman in history, which is boldly 
willing to take the theme of “Strengthening 
Maritime Cooperation in a Peaceful and 
Stable Indian Ocean” (KEMLU, 2016). 
Indonesia’s Chairman Terms are known to 
be also of great strategy, as IORA is known 
to be greatly active since India’s Chairman 
Terms of 2011-2013. 
It has already reached half the time, 
yet Indonesia has not shown any significant 
moves to establish a permanent change in 
the IORA. Since taking the seat of 
Chairman, Indonesia has helped craft the 
Padang Communique 2015, as well as the 
IORA Maritime Cooperation Declaration 
2015. The ministers of the member states of 
IORA during the 15th meeting of the 
Council of Ministers, established a 
communiqué which fundamentally, will not 
create any significant change towards the 
current political dynamics of the Indian 
Ocean. The only substantive on matters of 
security is Article 6, and even that focuses 
merely on establishing a more coherent 
regional cooperation in face of non-
traditional security threats such as 
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unregulated fishing, piracy, drug 
trafficking, etc. (IORA, 2015). Even that, it 
was not clear on how accurately they would 
coordinate this matter among all of the 
littoral states of the Indian Ocean. An 
ordinary problematic matter of formality in 
International treaties, that has no concrete 
measures on how that would be done. There 
have been talks of establishing an IORA 
Concord, but that has yet to show any 
results.  
 
2.2. Indonesia’s Urgency to Exert 
Influence Through the Indian Ocean 
Rim Association 
Consisting of thousands of islands, it 
has always been the fate of Indonesia to 
adopt a maritime-oriented policy. Though 
heavily voiced as an advantage, the 
consistency of thousands of islands 
establishes an immediate risk, as 
Indonesia’s naval power will be in need to 
be empowered, to patrol the vast seas of 
Indonesia. Considering the dilemma, Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), former 
President of the Republic of Indonesia, 
during his two terms, have introduced the 
discourse of maritime security which will 
be intertwined with the national policies of 
Indonesia. But this context of maritime 
security has never been fully embraced 
until Jokowi was elected president in 2014. 
One of the major foreign policy shifts 
that Jokowi embraces since elected is 
Indonesia as the ‘Global Maritime Axis.’ 
The discourse surfaced since the electoral 
debates in 2014. To make matters simple, 
this concept consists of 5 pillars (Agastia, 
Perwita, 2015), including Maritime 
Culture, Maritime Development, Maritime 
Economy, Maritime Diplomacy, and 
Maritime Security. The global maritime 
axis concept was then further elaborated as 
Jokowi continually voiced out his plan to 
bring the Indian Ocean back to Indonesia’s 
regional canvas, and making Indonesia 
evolve becoming a power in between the 
two continents, and the two oceans of 
which Indonesia is a littoral state of (India 
and Pacific Oceans) (Liow, Shekhar, 2014). 
Although massively embraced and 
supported in rhetoric by the Indonesian 
people and the global community, Jokowi’s 
global maritime axis is not without its 
issues. The most fundamental being the 
lack of clarity of what precisely is this very 
concept, a vision, strategy, or a policy. The 
confusion has led many analysts to 
confusion, as we see Jokowi continuously 
conduct domestic and foreign policies 
painted as means to achieve this global 
maritime axis. Since the electoral debates in 
2014, we have witnessed a strong emphasis 
on Indonesia being a civilizational hub 
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because of the strategic location between 
two major oceans. Outwardly speaking, this 
is far from expectation. And thus this is a 
major issue, as the whole maritime 
advancement discourses that Jokowi often 
echo is heavily hyped, leading to the overly 
built maritime euphoria on the domestic 
and International fronts.  
Confusions became more evident, as 
his maritime policies have tended to lean 
inwards, rather than outwards, or in other 
words, not a foreign policy. An example of 
this is how the outwards aspect of global 
maritime axis has been absent, while 
inwards, we see a greater emphasis on 
establishing stronger connectivity of the 
thousands of islands in Indonesia. The 
Inward policy orientation is marked with 
the project construction of 35 ports, in 
which 33 among them are located in the 
less-developed parts of Indonesia (Ekawati, 
2016). The ports of Indonesia has been 
categorized as highly under-invested, as 
well as neglected; therefore this classifies 
as an outstanding achievement. But the 
only downfall of this is that it solidifies the 
portrayed ambiguity of Jokowi’s global 
maritime axis, being more of an inward 
policy. This point can be proven 
problematic in the upcoming decade, as we 
see power rivalries have become more 
visible in the International community 
when it comes to the Indian Ocean. Ideally, 
Jokowi is in need of conceptualizing a 
global maritime axis based foreign policy, 
which touches the turbulent environment of 
the Indian Ocean.  
One of the more peaceful avenues to 
exert influence to create or at least have 
control of the political dynamics in the 
Indian Ocean is through the Indian Ocean 
Rim Association. This particular policy is 
strategic and less-coercive, as not only 
Indonesia is the current Chairman of the 
IORA, but also considering that 
engagement with International 
organizations to maintain good order and 
peace has always been the characteristics of 
the Indonesian foreign policy. Security of 
the sea-lanes of communication of the 
Indian Ocean is Indonesia’s priority, 
considering the difficulties Indonesia has 
had throughout history in managing non-
traditional threats that surfaced in the 
Straits of Malacca. As the Indian Ocean 
evolves being a major shipping lane for 
global commerce, Indonesia’s primary 
focus should be on building the foundations 
of cooperative relations among the littoral 
states of the Indian Ocean, with the 
inclusion of great foreign powers that 
potentially can change the course of 
political dynamics in the region. Thus in 
establishing a peaceful regional security 
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architecture in the Indian Ocean, Indonesia 
should re-embrace its foreign policy of 
establishing International cooperative 
norms, such as those adopted In ASEAN. 
Historically speaking, Indonesia has 
been known as the architecture of ASEAN 
institutions and norms (Putra, 2015). 
Indonesia became the driving force of the 
establishment of the Asian Zone for Peace, 
Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 
November 1971 and the Treaty of Amity 
and Cooperation in February 1976 
(ASEAN, 1971) (Liow, 1995). Both aimed 
during that time, to counter external 
interference, especially to solidify 
ASEAN’s political solidarity during the 
wake of revolutionary communism. Just a 
decade ago we also witnessed how the 
transition to democracy has successfully 
led to Indonesia being the main pusher of 
democratically based institutions to be 
adopted in ASEAN (Garnaut, 2012), 
including the ASEAN Intergovernmental 
Commission on Human Rights and the 
ASEAN Political and Security Community 
2015. 
IORA is in need to figure out the 
issue of offensive military posturing by 
states currently taking place in the Indian 
Ocean. It will be difficult to halt any 
unilateral decision makings such as naval 
exercises, yet regulating a collectively 
agreed code of conduct is necessary to at 
least establish common grounds of 
cooperation, and set limits. A legal 
document like the TOC is feasible to be 
negotiated especially to regulate both 
traditional and non-traditional threats 
occurring in the Indian Ocean. Cooperation 
is achievable, as we witness the numerous 
cooperation taking place in face of piracy in 
the Straits located in the Indian Ocean. An 
example is MALSINSO (Trilateral 
Coordinated Patrols for Malacca Strait), in 
which Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia 
conducted a non-stop patrol in the Malacca 
Strait (Collin, 2016). Cooperation also 
occurred through the Riyadh Memorandum 
of Understanding in 2005. Comprising of 
Gulf States (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates), the Memorandum had a primary 
aim of inspecting the cargos of the foreign 
ships that docked in those member states 
(Gupta, 2010).  
Considering Indonesia’s strategic 
position of Chairman, cooperation should 
be heavily embraced, because also the 
Indian Ocean’s security architecture is far 
from predictable, agreeing on grounds of 
freedom of navigation, and cooperation 
based patrols, for example, would clearly 
establish grounds of reassurance and 
collaboration among littoral states and great 
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powers of the Indian Ocean (Nelson, 
Sulaiman, 2015). The additional is that 
Indonesia is also able to reassure states in 
the region that through the crafting of a 
code of conduct in the Indian Ocean, 
Jokowi’s global maritime axis is not 
leaning towards a coercive based foreign 
policy. The lack of clarity of Jokowi’s 
global maritime axis has led multiple 
interpretations, including predicted 
possibilities of Indonesia’s benign 
intentions, as many have seen for example 
the current Indonesian Minister for Marine 
Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti, of 
having the policy of blowing up any foreign 
ships illegally trespassing the EEZ of 
Indonesia.  
Besides an emphasis on establishing 
the foundations of peaceful relations in the 
Indian Ocean, Indonesia in the remaining 
years of its Chairman position in the IORA 
needs to look carefully at the structure of 
the organization. IORA includes a vast 
amount of region, yet remains highly 
under-developed, and under-invested. One 
of the causes for this is that the highest 
authority of the IORA is through its 
Council of Ministers. The organization is 
desperately In need of a stronger structure 
that can clout a more substantial political 
influence. One of the platforms to realize 
this is the establishment of a Heads of 
States Summit to replace the Council of 
Ministers to being the highest authority in 
the IORA. That way, powers will take 
serious of the courses of action the summit 
decides upon. An example of this is 
ASEAN through its ASEAN Summit. 
Though arguable on its effectiveness, the 
courses of actions taken in the ASEAN 
Summit, has shaped the political dynamics 
of the South East Asian Region, and taken 
seriously by foreign powers, marked with 
the active engagements in the numerous 
outwards policies of ASEAN, including the 
ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN+3, and 
much more.  
 
D. CONCLUSION 
It is no question that the vast seas of 
the Indian Ocean are filled with numerous 
resources. But the International trade that 
goes through this region is one that we 
should keep an eye on. As the oceans 
transport commodities including 
manufactured goods from Asia, mineral 
and ores mined in Africa, and supply 
energy (petroleum, gas) sourced from the 
Middle Eastern states, it is no surprise that 
the Indian Ocean is filled with great powers 
exerting their influence to secure their 
export-import trades. Energy security is an 
important matter, and in this case, with 
India and China at the forefront of the 
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supremacy contestations of the Indian 
Ocean, it does not surface any surprises. 
Emerging economies tend to have similar 
patterns of needs, such as a surmountable 
amount of energy resources imported to 
fulfil the growing industry’s demands, as 
well as their overly populated population.  
The security environment of the 
contemporary Indian Ocean that we live 
today has an uncertain future, but one that 
through this paper I elaborate will most 
likely be filled with instability, caused by 
the surfacing of great power rivalries. The 
great power rivalries are an alarming 
development and one that states such as 
Indonesia cannot stand by in the corner and 
witness as contestations take place. The key 
here is empowering the Indian Ocean Rim 
Association, a point that many analysts 
won’t make as there simply is no life 
invested in the organization. But IORA 
holds great potential, as it is the only 
organization able to unite the numerous 
continents and states bordering themselves 
with the oceans. Jokowi has long echoed 
this concept of a global maritime axis that 
until today continues to bring a lot of 
confusion. Indonesia’s chairman position is 
the best time to clarify the lack of policies 
directed under the concept of a global 
maritime axis, and further embrace this 
need to empower the IORA and start 
building the foundations of cooperation in 
the Indian Ocean, as Indonesia will still be 
the Chairman of IORA until 2017. Though 
constrained by time, Indonesia must hold 
on to this concept, in order for the idea to 
resurface despite the changes that will 
occur on IORA in the upcoming years. 
Military posturing, development of ports in 
specified areas, are things that cannot be 
intervened as it concerns the national 
sovereignty of states. But, failing to 
construct a basic foundation on values of 
cooperation and peace, will deteriorate 
relations even further, making it too late to 
control the volatile political environment 
that most likely will be present in the 
upcoming years to come.  
 
REFERENCES 
Agastia, I Gusti Bagus Dharma & Perwita, 
A.A. Banyu. (2015). Jokowi’s 
Maritime Axis: Change and 
Continuity of Indonesia’s Role in 
Indo-Pacific. Journal of ASEAN 
Studies, Vol.3(1) 
 
Agnew, John, Mitchell, Katharyne & Toal, 
Gerard. (2013). A Companion to 
Political Geography. UK: Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd 
 
Albert, Eleanor. (2016). Competition in the 
Indian Ocean.Retrieved from 
http://www.cfr.org/regional-
security/competition-indian-
ocean/p37201 
 
Amjad, Shahid. (2007). Seabed Resources. 
In Maritime Threats and 
Bama Putra Andika… – The Surfacing of Great Power…. 
  
 
75 
Journal of Society and Governance 
Opportunities in the 21st Century, 
Conference Proceedings. Karachi, 
National Centre of Maritime Policy 
Research Bahria University 
 
ASEAN. (1971). Zone of Peace, Freedom, 
and Neutrality Declaration: Adopted 
by the Foreign Ministers at the 
Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers 
Meeting Kuala Lumpur. 
 
Chen, S. (2010). China’s Self Extrication 
from the “Malacca Dilemma” and 
Implications. International Journal 
of China Studies, Vol.1(1) 
 
Collin, Koh Swee Lean. (2016). The 
Malacca Strait Patrols: Finding 
Common Ground. Singapore: RSIS 
Commentary 
 
Ekawati, Janet Dyah. (2016). Indonesia’s 
Global Maritime Axis Askew. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.internationalaffairs.org.a
u/australian_outlook/indonesias-
global-maritime-axis-askew/ 
 
Garnaut, R. (2012). Indonesia in the New 
World Balance. In Anthony Reid 
(Ed.) Indonesia Rising: The 
Repositioning of Asia’s Third Giant. 
Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies 
 
Goud, R.Sidda & Mookherjee, Manisha. 
(2015). China In the Indian Ocean 
Region. Hyderabad: Allied 
Publishers 
 
IORA. (2015). IORA Communique 
Padang 2015 
 
KEMLU. (2016). Indian Ocean Rim 
Association. Retrieved from 
http://www.kemlu.go.id/id/kebijakan
/kerjasama-
regional/Pages/IORA.aspx  
 
Laipson, Ellen & Pandya, Amit. (2009). 
The Indian Ocean: Resource and 
Governance Challenges. India: 
Stimson Center 
 
Liow, Chinyong Joseph. (1995). 
Dictionary of the Modern Politics of 
Southeast Asia: 4th Edition. NY: 
Routledge 
 
Liow, Joseph Chinyong & Shekhar, 
Vibhanshu. (2014). Indonesia as a 
Maritime Power: Jokowi’s Vision, 
Strategies, and Obstacles Ahead. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/i
ndonesia-as-a-maritime-power-
jokowis-vision-strategies-and-
obstacles-ahead/  
 
Khurana, G. (2008). China’s String of 
Pearls in the Indian Ocean and Its 
Security Implications. Strategic 
Analysis, Vol.32(1) 
Manoj, Gupta. (2010). Indian Ocean 
Region: Maritime Regimes for 
Regional Cooperation. London: 
Springer 
 
Mearsheimer, John J. (2014). Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics. NY: Norton & 
Company Inc. 
 
Nelson, Brad & Sulaiman, Yohanes. 
(2015). Implications Jokowi’s 
Global Maritime Axis. Retrieved 
from https://www.stratfor.com/the-
hub/implications-jokowis-global-
maritime-axis 
 
Parameswaran, Prashanth. (2015). 
Australia-India To Hold First Ever 
Naval Exercise Amid China 
Concerns. Retrieved from 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/austr
alia-india-to-hold-first-ever-naval-
exercise-amid-china-concerns/ 
Journal of Society and Governance – Volume 1 No.1 January 2017  
(http://journal.unhas.ac.id/index.php/jsg) 
 
76 
Journal of Society and Governance 
 
Pillalamarri, Akhilesh. (2015). A Brief 
History of the US Navy in the Indian 
Ocean. Retrieved from 
http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/a-
brief-history-of-the-us-navy-in-the-
indian-ocean/ 
 
Putra, Bama Andika. (2015). Indonesia’s 
Leadership Role in ASEAN: History 
and Future Prospects. International 
E-Journal of Advances in Social 
Sciences, Vol.1(2) 
 
Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai & Mishra, 
Sylvia. (2015). India-Japan-U.S. 
Trilateral Dialogue Gains 
Additional Traction. East-West 
Center 
 
Rumley, Dennis, Doyle, Timothy & 
Chaturvedi, Sanjay. (2012). Securing 
the Indian Ocean? Competing 
Regional Security Constructions. 
Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 
Vol.8(1) 
 
Singh, Sudheer Pal. (2016). Can India 
Halve Oil Import Dependence by 
2030? Retrieved from 
http://www.business-
standard.com/article/economy-
policy/can-india-cut-down-its-oil-
import-dependence-by-a-half-by-
2030-115040800227_1.html 
 
Stein, Arthur A. (2008). Neoliberal 
Institutionalism. In Christian Reus-
Smit & Duncan Snidal (Ed.). NY: 
Oxford University Press 
 
Zhang, Z.X. (2011). China’s Energy 
Security, The Malacca Dilemma and 
Responses. Energy Security. Vol.39 
 
 
